Data Set
2609
Russian Informational Co-Aggression? Ukraine-Related Disinformation in Belarusian Pro-Government Telegram Channels
Version 1.2, published: Sept. 15, 2026.
Description
This dataset documents over 400 instances of Ukraine-related disinformation identified in more than 80,000 posts published in 2024 across seven major pro-government Telegram channels in Belarus. These channels include: Belorusskiy silovik, Obyektivnyy Yevgen, Zholtyye slivy Premium, Eto drugoye, Zapadnyye zaychiki, BelVPO, and Nevolfovich. Data collection was guided by the definition of disinformation outlined in the Information Disorder report (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017), which defines disinformation as “information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization, or country” (p. 20). The identified cases were grouped into recurring thematic clusters that emerged during the analysis. Prominent themes include: “Ukraine’s military draft,” “Negative public opinion on Ukraine-related matters in Western countries,” “Corruption.” Note that the dataset focuses exclusively on discrete and verifiable claims about specific facts, events, or actions. More general (diffuse) statements without a clearly identifiable factual basis were not added to the analysis, even when they could be interpreted as misleading; such statements include: evaluative assertions (including broad claims about the history of Ukraine or the Ukrainian nation), rhetorical expressions, or derogatory remarks. Videos or images from the battlefield, as well as claims concerning ongoing battlefield developments or events along the front line, were not analyzed either. Furthermore, videos longer than five minutes were not taken into consideration. The dataset was compiled by four trained and experienced coders and a team lead. Initially, resource constraints limited the analysis to five Telegram channels. In July 2024, however, two additional sources — Belorusskiy silovik and BelVPO — were added. Each of the seven channels had an estimated audience of at least around 20,000 subscribers in 2024. To determine whether a post contained disinformation, the coders relied on a number of reputable resources that monitor disinformation, including pro-Kremlin disinformation, such as EUvsDisinfo or StopFake, as well as several established international fact-checking services. More information on this is available in the attached data documents.
Countries
Keywords
Belarus Telegram Content Analysis Disinformation Ukraine War
Language of data
Disciplines
Comparative Politics, Media Studies